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SPECIAL PROBLEMS ARISING AS A RESULT OF
TRADING IN MULTIPLE MARKETS
Charles M. Nathan

MR. HAWES: We will now turn to Chuck Nathan, who is going
to deal with some of the problems arising when a security is traded
in a number of markets.
1.

BARRIERS TO ENTRY INTO THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS

MR. NATHAN: We have been talking for most of the day about
international securities markets. Although some of the discussion
has been in terms of discrete markets, we have also spoken at length
about linkages between markets and about internationalization and
harmonization among the markets. One of the clear patterns that has
emerged from the discussion is a sharp geographical boundary that
has been drawn around the U.S. For comparison look at the Eurodollar market today. By and large, the Eurodollar market is a multinational market, a market that transcends and functions efficiently
across national boundaries.
There are a number of factors that have contributed to this
situation--if you will, a "fortress America" approach. U.S. tax
law is one element that has led to market segregation. One of the
important components of the discontinuity between the international
Euro-markets and the U.S. domestic market is the U.S. securities
laws.
I would like to sketch out the nature of the fence that the
U.S. securities laws have built around the domestic U.S. securities
markets. The starting point for analysis is the Securities Act of
1933. Although it is not the only securities law one has to deal
with in the analysis, it is by far the most important single statute.
2.

THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND U.S. SECURITIES ISSUED ABROAD

A.

Jurisdictional Scope

To understand the present situation, one must start with a
technical analysis of the Securities Act of 1933. For the sake of
simplicity, I will paraphrase and generalize and try not to be too
technical. Essentially, the Securities Act of 1933 states that no
one may make a public offering of securities, if the offering utilizes an instrumentality of interstate commerce, unless the securities have been registered with the SEC.
The only territorial notion built into this broad prohibition
is the idea of interstate commerce, which includes (and it is important to note that it includes) commerce between the U.S. and foreign countries. International telephone calls, international mail,
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shipping documents overseas--anything of that sort involves the socalled jurisdictional aspect of the 1933 Act. This is the only
part of the Act that speaks specifically to the jurisdictional reach
of the statute, which is therefore quite broad.
In addition to the very broad jurisdictional purview of the
statute is its very broad notion of distribution. The concept of
a public distribution of securities under the 1933 Act goes well
beyond what might be termed formal distribution mechanics. When an
issuer sells securities to an underwriter under an underwriting
agreement, and the underwriter then redistributes those securities-that, in and of itself, may not conclude the distribution. The 1933
Act encompasses a concept (which has been developed by common law,
by SEC pronouncement, and by gloss) that the distribution is not
completed until the securities reach the hands of the ultimate investor. The identity of that ultimate investor is one of the great unknowns of 1933 Act legal lore.
However, if one looks today at the Eurodollar market and some
of the common distribution practices, questions can easily be raised
about when the distribution of a given Euro-security issue is really
completed. For example, an underwriter may place some of the securities in distribution into a managed account with the intention of
pulling those securities back out of the managed account a week later,
if the market is favorable, to sell into the U.S. I think most securities lawyers in the U.S. would conclude that the distribution is
not completed when the securities go into the managed account--but
rather, that it is completed when the securities are resold into the
U.S. However, by the act of selling unregistered securities into
the U.S., we are invoking the Securities Act of 1933 and creating
an illegal, unregistered public distribution within the terms of
that Act. It was this analytical starting point that led in large
part to the creation of the Eurodollar market.
B.

SEC Release No. 4708

The key event in the genesis and development of the Eurodollar,
Euro-security market was a release that the Securities and Exchange
Commission published in 1964--SEC release No. 4708 []. This release sets forth a very important principle and, indeed, probably
represents a codification of prior SEC staff practice and understanding. Release 4708 states that if someone issues securities, under
circumstances reasonably designed to preclude their distribution or
re-distribution into the U.S. or to U.S. nationals living abroad,
then the Securities and Exchange Commission will not take any enforcement action even if the transactions technically involved the
use of a means of interstate commerce.
The release thus is a gloss on the Act--a voluntary adoption
of a more narrow concept of the jurisdictional reach of the 1933 Act.
The practice that began in 1964 and continues today is an effort to
interpret those magic words in Release 4708. What is "reasonably
designed to preclude the illegal distribution or re-distribution of
securities into the U.S."?
I find it useful to distinguish between U.S. issuers and foreign issuers. U.S. issuers, as a realistic matter, are subject to
SEC jurisdiction in a very concrete way. There is no question that
a U.S. issuer has to live with the SEC day in and day out, and cannot afford to take any significant chance of a violation of the 1933
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Act. I think that is the prevailing spirit in the U.S.; it is clearly the advice of virtually every U.S. securities lawyer.
Accordingly, U.S. issuers in the Euro-market have always approached the 1933 Act problem on a conservative basis, acknowledging
Various techniques have evolved over
that compliance is essential.
the years--particularly since the repeal of the interest equalization tax in 1974--to come to grips with Release 4708. These techniques have developed into a so-called ninety day "lock-up", which
is described in more detail in the outline appended to this chapter.
C.

The Ninety Day Lock-up

One of the interesting aspects of the ninety day lock-up technique is that, although it was initially sanctioned by no-action
letters, its evolution has not similarly been sanctioned. Thus,
there are several relatively early no-action letters in which the
SEC staff said, in effect, that the staff would not take any action
if specified procedures were followed. In so doing, the staff
agreed, although it did not so state affirmatively, that the described lock-up procedures were reasonably designed to prevent the illegal
distribution of securities into the U.S. Since these 1974-1976 noaction letters there have been a number of developments in the lockup area. So far as I am aware, however, the new developments have
never been presented to the SEC staff.
The original ninety day lock-up procedure contemplated issuance of individual temporary certificates. Each purchaser received
his own temporary certificate, which did not have interest coupons
attached. The temporary certificate was not exchangeable for the
definitive certificate until ninety days after the distribution was
completed. The definition of completion was spelled out in the underwriting papers. It required a procedure where every underwriter
informed the managing underwriter that his portion of the distribution had been completed. The managing underwriter then reached a
determination that the entire distribution was complete, and ninety
days was measured from that time. At the conclusion of the ninety
day period under the old scheme the individual investors, the nonU.S. investors, would present their temporary certificates for exchange for definitive certificates with the attached interest coupon.
As the final measure of protection, each holder was required to certify that he was not a U.S. national or resident.
Somewhere along the line a modified procedure evolved that
today is virtually universal. The temporary certificate, which obviously entails a great deal of paperwork and back-office mechanical
problems, has been abandoned in favor of a so-called global certificate. A global certificate is issued to a clearing agency, and
it cannot be broken up into definitive individual certificates until
the magic ninety day period ends. In the meantime, it is possible
to trade interests in the global certificate. Nonetheless, at the
end of the ninety day period, the holder of such interest, in order
to obtain a definitive certificate, must make the requisite certification stating that he is not a U.S. national or resident.
When you get a group of technicians together, lawyers who
practice in this area, you could probably argue far into the night
as to the relative merits of the two lock-up systems. Which one is
better designed to prevent an illegal (that is, unregistered) distribution into the U.S.? The point I want to make is that the decision to switch from the temporary certificate to the global certifi-
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cate has been made without consultation of the SEC. That is very
characteristic of the practices that have grown up under Release
4708. Individual lawyers--working with their clients--have rendered
their own judgments as to what is compliance with Release 4708 and
what means are reasonably designed to prevent the illegal distribution of securities into the U.S. This practice has raised a number
of serious practical problems.
Lawyers may have different views on the subject.

The circum-

stances of each offering may be very different. When you are practicing in this area, you are continually confronted with the pattern
of somebody pulling a document out of his briefcase and saying, "XYZ
company did it this way. Why can't we?" And then you have to defend
the advice you have given if it is more conservative--which is
the only time somebody cites an example like that--and explain why
you disagree with the decision that XYZ's lawyers presumably made.
Moreover, compliance with the 1933 Act in the context of foreign
offerings of securities is an area in which ignorance plays a significant role. Ignorance, lack of sophistication, and relative degrees of conservatism or bravery play important and real roles.
Often you see discrepancies in practice that cannot be rationally
justified, other than that is the way the world works in practice.
MR. HAWES: Could I interrupt there for just a moment, Chuck?
I wanted to ask the two investment bankers from a marketing standpoint and so forth, what is the effect of the rule? If there were
no such flow-back procedure, would more securities come back into
the U.S.? What is your feeling about the business context of this
problem?
MR. VON CLEMM: As far as we are concerned you can have a
three hundred and sixty day lock-up if you want.
MR. HAWES: And that is because they really are being sold to
European investors and they are not going to be flowed back anyway?
MR. VON CLEMM:

That is our experience.

MR. COLES: I think I would endorse what Michael said, but in
the opposite direction. I think the market has become so trained
now that Eurobond securities do not come back into the U.S. until
after some reasonable seasoning period. You need not have a lockup at all.
MR. NATHAN: That is probably the reality; it certainly is my
impression from my experience in this area. With all the hullabaloo
about the lock-up procedures, the difficulties, the mechanical aspects, why do we do it? The reality is that it has had virtually no
effect in the market; and compliance is not difficult.
D.

Equity Issues

There is another important aspect of the lock-up rule--coming
back to a comment made earlier in the program--and that is equity
offerings in Europe. U.S. issuers can devise lock-up procedures for
convertible debt issues, but the flow-back problem (the potential of
the security coming back into the U.S.) obviously increases when you
switch from a straight debt offering. Debt issues are designed for
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European market conditions, designed to be attractive to European
investors, and they often are quite different from the type of
instrument U.S. investors are looking for. With an equity issue-the prototype is common stock--the flow-back problem probably is
not soluble.
How do you prevent common stock of General Motors issued'in
Europe from flowing back into the U.S.? What devices can you possibly imagine that will be effective to lock-up shares in Europe
until their distribution is complete? This may not be the only reason why American companies have not issued common stock in Europe,
but it is clearly one of the major reasons. The one no-action letter that exists in this area suggests that a ninety day lock-up is
not sufficient. You also must place a restrictive legend on the
shares and, perhaps, require approval by counsel for every individual trade involving a U.S. national. That is obviously a procedure
that is unworkable in real life.
I would like to suggest that with the movement towards integration utilizing the Form S-16 registration statement, there no
longer is a significant timing difference between an unregistered
Eurodollar offering and a registered U.S. offering. We can do a
Eurodollar offering today in forty-eight hours and, practically
speaking, we can do an S-16 in forty-eight hours. The timing using
Form S-16 is not significantly different from that of a fast-track
Eurodollar offering. We have, or should have, outgrown the old bugaboo that the Eurodollar offering was fast and quick, involving no
long hassle with the SEC or those horrible things called the registration and comment processes. Today, in terms of timing and mechanics, the SEC registration process is the equal of the Eurodollar
process in terms of speed and flexibility in coming to market.
MR. HAWES:
For the large companies, the same companies that
would be issuing ....
MR. NATHAN: The realistic issuers in Europe, the people whom
the European investment community will accept, are by and large S-16
a company like Ford is not
issuers. There is a small irony here:
an S-16 issuer this year, because in 1980 it lost money. That is
going to be a problem for one year--if Ford makes money this year.
Except for the irony that some of the largest U.S. companies cannot
use S-16 because of a loss year, there are more S-16 companies than
are likely to be saleable in Europe--at least at present.
There is a great deal of congruity. One can think in terms
of registering a world class offering of securities with the SEC.
Let us forget about lock-up mechanics; why worry about them? They
are a nuisance. Register on Form S-16. If the issuer or underwriters want to design a security that is designated for, or designed to appeal to, the Eurodollar market, go ahead and do it. If
there are Americans who are benighted enough to want that security,
let them buy it. In the equity area, where the design on the security is probably much less significant and there is much less variation in terms of the markets, this seems to me clearly the right
way to go. I am somewhat surprised that registration of Euro-offerings on Form S-16 has not started to happen. At least, it has not
in my experience.
I suspect part of the problem is that the pressures of getting
to market are so large today. Investment bankers and attorneys just
do not have time to step back and ask, why are we following the
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classic pattern we are following? If the client calls up and says,
"We are doing a Eurodollar issue in forty-eight hours," you get out
the Eurodollar papers and mark them up. You never stop to think,
is there another way to skin this cat? But it is time that we begin
thinking about new approaches, and I believe in the long run many
artificial distinctions between a Eurodollar security and an American security will break down. The market will demand what it demands with regard to terms: interest rates, maturities, bearer
versus registered bonds. That is fine, and you can design a security directed to a specific market. But let us stop worrying about
registration versus lack of registration and lock-ups for the U.S.
companies.
3.

FOREIGN ISSUERS IN THE U.S.

RAPKETS

The much harder problem appears when we turn to foreign companies. The typical foreign company was for many years virtually
oblivious to the problems of the 1933 Act and Release 4708. (This,
of course, is a crude generalization.) Although it is not true of
every Eurodollar offering, over the years there have been a great
number of offerings denominated in dollars by European issuers that,
in effect, ignored the 1933 Act and Release 4708. This pattern,
however, has begun to change; and I think the market and the documentation are reflecting the change. More and more European issuers
are becoming known to the U.S. investing community. (I want to come
back to that in the context of the secondary markets.) A number of
them have done Yankee bond issues--not a great many, but there have
been a number of Yankee bond issues by private companies. Commercial paper programs are expanding on behalf of European issuers.
The American market is waking up to the attractiveness of the European issuers, on both the equity and the debt sides.
A.

Flow-back

As this happens, the potential for the European-issued security to flow into the U.S. becomes more and more real. The distinction between the U.S. issuer and the foreign issuer in terms of likelihood of the security trading in the U.S. begins to break down.
The result has been a somewhat confused set of patterns that are
being adopted by European issuers in their Euro-security issues.
Some European issuers make what one might call a minimal attempt at
satisfying Release 4708 by merely stating that the securities are
not to be sold in the U.S. A somewhat more cautious approach is to
have contractual promises on the part of the underwriting group not
to sell in the U.S., but without any lock-up procedure. Other European or non-U.S. issuers--the Canadians also play a great role in
this--have gone to the full ninety day lock-up procedure.
There are any number of patterns, and the rhyme and reason
for them are difficult to discern. As a practical matter, the approach to the 1933 Act and Release 4708 depends largely on the
sophistication and attitude of a small group of people, usually the
lawyers who--often under great time pressure--make the decision as
to appropriate compliance.
Many of the U.S. lawyers working in this area are aware of
and are trying to come to grips with the problem, but their European and English colleagues may not be as aware. There is also the
difficulty of reaching a consensus and ultimately of answering
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correctly the fundamental question--what is "reasonably designed to
prevent an illegal distribution"--when you are dealing with a myriad
of foreign companies and entities issuing very different kinds of
paper, ranging from twenty or twenty-five year straight debt instruments to very, very short-term floating-rate notes. A solution that
may be reasonable in one circumstance may be unreasonable in another.
There is also the problem of the so-called "tap" issues, which are,
in effect, repeat issues or a continuous issue. How do you deal
with that type of offering under the 1933 Act? How do you deal with

the floating-rate instruments?

How do you deal with short-term pa-

per? These have created serious problems for the lawyers, and they
are struggling for solutions.
B.

Disclosure

MR. FRIEDMAN: Chuck, are you in accord with the general
approach that the Commission has taken to the problems--the whole
notion of the applicability of a lock-up and of the ADR [American
Depository Receipts] procedure? Does all that make sense to you,
or do you think we ought to be doing something different?
MR. NATHAN: Yours is a hard question, Steve. The ADR issue,
I think, presents highly specialized problems that are somewhat different.
MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, they are really concerned with what disclosure obligations arise when those securities end up in our markets.
The essence of integration is to erase the difference between the
disclosure obligations arising from a distribution and from secondary
trading in the market. So in some sense, it is really the same issue.
MR. NATHAN: The problem is, given the variety of factual patterns, can we try to conceive of a simple set of rules to deal with
them? I am very skeptical. I am afraid that if we try to set up a
simple set of rules they will turn out to be onerous rules. We will
start out with the idea that we cannot take any chances; therefore,
maybe ninety days is not enough. If the SEC were forced or chose to
make pronouncements in this area in a more formal way ....
MR. FRIEDMAN:
I am really suggesting that the whole notion
of a lock-up--ninety days or a thousand days--may be misguided, because the essential question is the nature of the information available in our markets when securities are traded here. That is the
underlying policy issue.
(i) 20-F registration
MR. NATHAN: That is right. That is the bottom line, Steve.
But how do you come to grips with that issue through Form 20-F, for
example? I think we are all prepared to accept the idea of using
integration, as Bob Pozen was suggesting. The problem is 20-F.
How many foreign issuers are now reporting on 20-F? The last time
I looked, it was something like twenty-eight. There are not many
companies out there prepared to go through the 20-F disclosure process. They are no more prepared to go through the 20-F disclosure
process than they were prepared to go through the historical S-1
disclosure process. Until we can solve that problem, I do not think
we can solve the flow-back problem and the secondary market problem.
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MR. POZEN:
Form 20-F is for companies that are listed on
exchanges. Foreign issuers are not listed on exchanges in most
cases unless they are making a primary offering in the U.S. It might
have been more logical for the SEC to start off by reforming the
1933 Act forms and then to work with the 1934 Act forms. Once the
SEC decides on the modifications for 1933 Act forms for foreign issuers, we will see more issuers using Form 20-F.
(ii)

Viewpoint of foreign issuers
MR. NATHAN: I am very dubious about that, Bob. I have counselled a number of foreign issuers considering a public offering in
the U.S. The fundamental disclosure problems are there. Form 20-F
is perhaps better than Form S-I, but it is not much better. Foreign
issuers are still very, very averse to disclosure. Frankly, they
are concerned that they will be caught up in a disclosure system
over which they have no control. If they look at what has happened
to the SEC reporting system over the last fifteen or twenty years,
the pattern for domestic issuers is one of increased disclosure, increased disclosure, increased disclosure. I cannot promise a foreign
issuer that this pattern of increased disclosure is not going to
continue in the future or that it will not apply to foreign issuers.
I do not suggest that this is the wrong pattern. Looking at
it as a domestic lawyer worrying about U.S. companies, I have always
been very sympathetic with the full disclosure pattern. I think the
new management analysis is a welcome step. It is very interesting
but difficult to deal with. When you show it to a foreign issuer,
that ends the discussion. The typical foreign issuer does not want
to hear anything more about it; all it cares about is staying away
from the SEC and the SEC's disclosure system. I agree with Michael
Coles' remarks this morning: somewhere there is a line one can draw
on a cost/benefit basis. The question is difficult. When is the
level of pain to the foreign issuer sufficiently reduced to entice
him into our markets, and what can or should we offer him?
MR. HAWES: Do you have the same catalogue of concerns that
Michael had? The segment reporting, the executive compensation,
and so on? Or it is just that there is too much information required?
MR. NATHAN: Well, that is the catalogue that you tend to run
up against time after time after time.
MR. POZEN:

When dealing with foreign issuers, you often have

a vague and general feeling that there is a problem in coming to the
SEC. If you ask the issuers to be specific, they usually object to
segment reporting, and management remuneration, and that sort of

thing.

But if you say to them then, "Well, look what has happened

in 20-F. Could you live with that?" Most of the ones I have talked
to say, "I could live with that and I am sort of interested." You
are suggesting that even if the SEC took all the 20-F accommodations
and put them into the 1933 Act forms, there would still be specific
disclosure problems that foreign issuers would have over and above
the general thought that the SEC could come after them. What specific other problems do you see?
MR. NATHAN: I think it is clearly true that 20-F is better
than S-1 right now, and that is a help. But the accounting area is
a very, very difficult problem, and the auditing area . ...
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SEC in 20-F said you could use your own, non-GAAP standards; you
just have to explain the material differences. I think that is all
anybody can hope for.
MR. HAWES: And Roy Herbert says that for the three hundred
biggest companies those standards are not all that different.
MR. NATHAN: But there is a '- mendous problem with auditing
standards in a lot of countries.
MR. POZEN: Auditing standards? Roy would say that most of
the issuers that are seriously thinking of coming into the U.S. are
probably using Big Eight accounting firms or Big Eight affiliates.
MR. NATHAN: Generalizations are difficult. There is no question but that we can go too far in any of these ways. Form 20-F is
voluntary. Nobody has to list. Everybody who has listed--with a
few historical accidents--has done so on the basis of a voluntary
decision and their own cost/benefit ideas. To say, "We will make it
a little bit easier," means a few more people will make the voluntary decision. I am not suggesting it is a desirable thing to rush
to woo foreign issuers. My point was that until we solved the fundamental problem of 1933 Act registration and 1934 Act reporting in
a way acceptable to foreign companies, we are not going to be able
to solve the flow-back problem involving their securities through
some simplified registration form like S-16. Foreign companies are
not going to register under the 1933 Act just to avoid ninety day
lock-ups.
(iii)

Psychological barriers

MR. FRIEDMAN:
I think what Bob was suggesting is what I was
groping toward earlier. The fact that a small number of companies
have chosen to register suggests that this is really not a minor
problem. What is involved is a much deeper suspicion about getting
involved with the Commission and the disclosure system--fear of
future changes, of the enforcement program, of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and of the whole panoply of corporate governance
issues.
MR. NATHAN: I think that is right, Steve. It is a psychological barrier, much of which is based on fear of the unknown. The
amount of misinformation that foreign issuers have about what the
process entails and how painful it is, is astounding. They also have
misinformation about our antitrust enforcement policies. I have
talked to a large number of foreign issuers who are convinced the
antitrust agencies are a political tool designed to punish foreign
companies so that American companies can prosper. This view is very
far from the truth, but somehow a number of foreign companies have
managed to persuade themselves. There is a tremendous amount of
psychological resistance to U.S. legal concepts, and it is not just
in the securities area.
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4.

SECONDARY MARKET TRADING IN FOREIGN SECURITIES

I now would like to address the question of secondary market
trading in the U.S. of foreign issued securities. As Steve said
earlier, the current movement in the U.S. is to avoid artificial
distinctions between primary offerings and secondary offerings. But
we do have a secondary market--a very large and liquid secondary
market--in the U.S. What is the role of foreign securities in that
market? I have time only to make a few observations.
Broker-dealers and investment bankers tell me that today a
number of major firms are making concerted marketing efforts among
their U.S. institutional customers to sell them on the merits of
investing in foreign securities. They do it on the debt side on the
basis of yield curves and yield spreads and similar differentials.
Their pitch is to convince the U.S. institution that investing in a
foreign security is just money in the pocket, very often from the
same issuer. If you can buy a Ford Motor bond that yields twelve
percent here and a similar Ford Motor Eurodollar bond is yielding
fourteen percent in Europe, you know which one you should buy. On
the equity side, there is a similar effort to introduce Americans to
foreign equity issues. A number of firms are trying to market foreign equities and foreign debt instruments to their customers in the
U.S., and they are creating more analytical tools to aid their efforts. Analysts are following more foreign companies. They are
doing studies of sovereign risk on a country by country and area by
area basis. They are trying to educate their customers.
A.

Effects of the 1933 Act

The U.S. securities laws are not the only hindrance to this
effort to increase investment in foreign securities. Legal investment laws and tax laws cause difficulties too. But one of the fundamental problems is the 1933 Act because--going back to the starting
point of this discussion--the 1933 Act is structured to bar offers
and sales of securities using interstate commerce unless there has
been a registration statement or there is an exemption from registration.
The exemption that permits the U.S. domestic secondary market
to operate is the so-called dealer's exemption in section 4(3). It
has a number of clauses and is a very difficult statutory provision
to work with. One of the clauses of section 4(3) states that forty
days after a bona fide public offering any dealer can trade a security. That is a clear exemption; the dealer is free to do it. If
you were to consider only this exemption, you might wonder why we
have developed such elaborate procedures for Euro-securities, including ninety day lock-ups, and instead assume that forty days after
the public offering in Europe anyone would be free to bring the
Euro-securities into the U.S.
There are two major caveats to that forty day exemption that
explain why life cannot be so simple. One is that the forty day
exemption is not applicable to an underwriter. Second, it is not
applicable with respect to a dealer's allotment in an underwriting.
This brings us to the fundamental question of direct or indirect
participation in the distribution. Stated most simply, the forty
day exemption is not available if the broker-dealer is directly or
indirectly participating in the distribution. In other words, the
exemption operates safely only when a dealer purchases securities
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from the ultimate investor after they have come to rest in his hands
and after the distribution is complete.
How does a broker-dealer know what kinds of securities he
is being offered in Europe to re-sell in the U.S. and who they are
from? Historically, the SEC has demanded that the broker-dealer
community police the market in the U.S. with respect to foreignissued securities as well as domestic issues. A broker-dealer's
policing obligation is hard to find written in the law as such. But,
as a practical matter, the brokerage community in the U.S. must police its trading activities in foreign securities and cannot afford
to get caught bringing foreign securities to the U.S. as part of the
original offering. Any repeated pattern of doing this, and you know
that Stanley Sporkin will appear on your doorstep.
B.

The Seasoning Rule

The result of the need by brokers for self-policing has been
another one of these ad hoc sets of rules--usually called the seasoning rule. Every brokerage firm has its own seasoning rule, and
the seasoning rules are different. Broker A says, "I am going to be
very safe. I will not trade a foreign security until at least a year
after it was originally issued because I do not trust the European
distribution practices. It is not worth my bother to have the SEC
on my back. I am not going to touch any European issued security
until a year after the initial distribution, and even then I am going
to be aware of the circumstances. If there are suspicious circumstances, I will make inquiry."
Broker-dealer B says, "A year is too
long.
I will take six months."
Broker C is in between and says,
"Nine months," and it can point to an analogy in another SEC rule.
There is, of course, at least one problem: a problem of different rules. There is no uniformity, and there is always the risk
of a race to the bottom--each time a broker ratchets down its seasoning period by a week or a month, its competitors may ratchet down
their seasoning period too because they do not want to be left behind.
Here is an area where it seems to me that effective SEC rule
making is possible, although not easy. There was once an attempt to
persuade the SEC to adopt a ninety day presumptive seasoning rule.
That was in 1974, I believe. It went nowhere. I do not know whether
it failed because of the concern that the proposed ninety day seasoning period was not long enough or it failed because the SEC was not
willing to get involved in what conceptually may be a factual morass.
If you consider the underlying principles, you find yourself
in an area where the facts count. The crucial fact to be determined
is whether or not the securities in question are part of a distribution. Passage of time can be only presumptive, and it may be that
the SEC felt it was not prepared to have an absolute time rule that
would prevail over the true facts of the case. Nevertheless, there
is a barrier to bringing European securities into the U.S. secondary
market--the informal seasoning rules designed to ensure the availability of the dealer's exemption under the 1933 Act for secondary
market trading.
NOTES
[M1

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964).
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A.

Secondary Trading in the United States of Unregistered
Securities Issued Abroad

I.

Introduction:

The Euro-security Market

The registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
(the "1933 Act"), apply to the offer or sale of any security involving the use
of interstate commerce or the mails unless an exemption is available. Section
2(7) of the 1933 Act defines "interstate commerce" to include "trade or commerce
in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto . . . between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia."
Accordingly, the 1933 Act would appear to require U.S. corporations to register
all offerings of securities abroad even if limited to non-U.S. nationals or residents. Moreover, offerings by either U.S. or foreign corporations abroad to U.S.
nationals or residents (directly, or indirectly through dealers, individuals, or
institutions performing the customary role of dealers) would appear to require
1933 Act registration if any jurisdictional means have been utilized.
a) Release 4708.
In Release No. 33-4708, July 9, 1964 (Release 4708),
however, the SEC indicated it would not recommend enforcement action under
Section 5 of the 1933 Act if U.S. corporations failed to register offerings of
securities abroad to foreign nationals, notwithstanding that the offering originated in the U.S., that domestic broker-dealers were involved, or that the
mechanics of distribution were effected in the U.S., provided that the offers
were made under circumstances "reasonably designed to preclude distribution or
redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United States."
The SEC noted, however, that distributions of securities by U.S. corporations
in Canada through the facilities of Canadian stock exchanges "may be expected
to flow into the hands of American investors and may therefore be subject to
registration." U.S. corporations have issued securities in the Euro-security
market to non-U.S. nationals or residents in reliance on Release 4708 by utilizing procedures intended to assure that the securities "come to rest" abroad-i.e., that the entire distribution process results in the securities being held
by or for the benefit of non-U.S. investors, as opposed to intermediaries in the
distribution chain who are holding for resale to U.S. investors. These procedures have been strengthened since 1974, when the Interest Equalization Tax was
allowed to expire, thus eliminating a major economic impediment to the purchase
by U.S. residents and nationals of unregistered securities issued abroad.
b) The 90-Day Lock-Up of Debt Issues.

With respect to the distribution

abroad by U.S. corporations of debt securities denominated in U.S. dollars, the
following procedures are generally followed:
(1) Contractual restrictions contained in underwriting documents
prohibit participants in the distribution from offering or selling the securities constituting their allotment in the U.S. or to nationals or residents of
the U.S.until ninety days after the distribution abroad has been completed, as
determined by the manager.
(2) Participating underwriters further agree that they will not, as
principal or agent, make any offers or sales of any of the Euro-securities (not
just their allotments) in the U.S. or to U.S. nationals or residents until ninety
days after the completion of the distribution, as determined by the manager.
(3) Each underwriter and selling group member agrees to deliver a written
confirmation to each purchaser of securities from it. With respect to retail
purchasers, the confirmation states that such purchaser agrees not to offer or
sell the securities in the U.S. or to U.S. nationals or residents prior to ninety
days after completion of the distribution. If the purchaser is a dealer, the
confirmation states that the dealer has not and will not offer or sell the se-
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curities in the U.S. or to U.S. nationals or residents, that such dealer is not
purchasing the securities for the account of any U.S. national or resident, and
that such dealer will include similar statements on written confirmations delivered to purchasers of the securities from it.
(4) Each underwriter and member in the selling group is required to
confirm by telex to the managing underwriter that its allotment has been sold
outside the U.S. to non-U.S. residents or nationals.
(5) Individual temporary certificates are originally issued for the
distributed securities, without interest coupons or conversion privileges,
as the case may be. The temporary certificates are not exchangeable for permanent certificates until ninety days after the managing underwriter has
advised the participants, on the basis of "all-sold" telexes and other factors,
that the distribution has been completed abroad. Furthermore, such permanent
certificates are issuable only upon receipt of a certification from the beneficial owner that such owner is not a national or resident of the U.S. An
important variation on this procedure is the initial issuance of a single noninterest bearing global bond, representing the entire issue, which is deposited
with a clearing system and which is exchangeable at a later date for definitive
bond certificates.
These ninety day lock-up procedures have been approved in no-action
letters issued by the SEC staff. See, e.g., Fairchild Camera and Instrument
International Finance N.V. (avail. December 15, 1976); Raymond International Inc.
(avail. June 28, 1976); The Singer Company (avail. September 3, 1974); Pacific
Lighting Corp. (avail. June 13, 1974). As far as we are aware, however, the use
of a global bond certificate deposited with a foreign clearing system has not
yet been directly approved by the SEC staff in a no-action letter.
Mhether non-U.S. dollar denominated obligations of U.S. issuers should be
issued in the Euro-security market subject to all of the elaborate safeguards
described above with respect to U.S. dollar denominated issues is less clear.
For a description of one variation on these lock-up procedures approved by the
SEC staff in connection with an issue of yen-denominated bonds primarily in Japan
by a wholly-owned financing subsidiary of Sears Roebuck & Co., see Sears Overseas
Finance, r.V. (avail. April 13, 1979).
The ninety day lock-up period referred to above was apparently derived
by analogy to Section 4(3) of the 1933 Act (the "dealer's exemption"). Section
4(3) exempts from the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of Section 5 of the 1933 Act:
transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer
acting as an underwriter in respect of the security involved
in such transaction), except -(A) transactions taking place prior to the expiration of
forty days after the first date upon which the security was
bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or
through the underwriter,
(B) transactions in a security as to which a registration
statement has been filed taking place prior to the expiration
of forty days after the effective date of such registration
statement or prior to the expiration of forty days after the
first date upon which the security was bona fide offered to the
public by the issuer or by or through an underwriter after such
effective date, whichever is later (excluding in the computation of such forty'days any time during which a stop order
issued under section 8 is in effect as to the security), or
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such shorter period as the Commission may specify by
rules and regulations or order, and
(C) transactions as to securities constituting the
whole or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription
by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of
such securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter.
With respect to transactions referred to in clause (B),
if securities of the issuer have not previously been sold
pursuant to an earlier effective registration statement
the applicable period, instead of forty days, shall be ninety
days, or such shorter period as the Commission may specify
by rules and regulations or order.
Although the forty day period prescribed by paragraph (A) of Section 4(3)
would appear to be more relevant to the offering of unregistered securities that
had been sold outside the U.S. to non-U.S. investors, the no-action letters referred to above appear to have fixed upon a ninety day period by analogy to
paragraph (B) of Section 4(3).
In certain circumstances, however, it may be advisable for U.S. issuers
to extend the lock-up procedures for more than ninety days. For example, in
connection with an issue of units, consisting of Series A bonds and warrants to
purchase Series B bonds, where the warrants are not exercisable for six months,
a U.S. issuer probably should view the offering of Series A bonds, warrants and
Series B bonds as one distribution, and therefore probably should choose a longer
lock-up period of, perhaps, nine months in order to make sure that all of the
offered securities come to rest abroad.
c) Equity Issues. Because offerings abroad to non-U.S. nationals or
residents of equity securities of U.S. companies appear to present a greater risk
of flow-back to the U.S. market, the SEC has granted no-action letters in these
circumstances only where transfer of the equity securities was prohibited absolutely for ninety days after the completion of the distribution abroad and transfers were permitted after the ninety day period only if, in the opinion of counsel,
such transfers would be in compliance with the registration requirements of the
1933 Act or an exemption therefrom. Certificates representing such shares are
usually legended and appropriate stop transfer instructions are usually given to
the transfer agent. See e.g., American Eastern Real Estate and Investment Corporation (avail. November 27, 1978); Foote, Cone & Belding Communications, Inc.
(avail. June 21, 1976).
d) Partnership Interests. A series of recent no-action letters have
approved the sale outside the U.S. to non-U.S. nationals or residents of limited
partnership interests in limited partnerships organized in the U.S. without compliance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. In order to restrict
the flow-back of such limited partnership interests to the U.S. and, in several
of the offerings, Canada as well, the limited partnership agreements provided
that (i) all transfers of limited partnership interests must be approved by the
general partners, (ii) no such transfers may be made to U.S. (or Canadian) nationals or residents within twelve months after completion of the distribution,
and (iii) notwithstanding the expiration of such twelve month period, no transfers may be made to U.S. (or Canadian) nationals and residents unless such limited
partnership interests are registered under the 1933 Act or an opinion of counsel
has been delivered to the general partners that such transfers are exempt from
registration. In addition, underwriters and service agents in the offering must
agree not to offer or sell the limited partnership interests in the U.S. (or
Canada)
or
to
nationals
or
residents
of
the
U.S.
(or

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

CAL Nathan / Tradingin niultiple narkets
Canada). See Pembroke Pines Plaza Associates, Ltd. (avail. September 22, 1980);
Forest Oil Corp. (avail. August 11, 1980); ONEC Exploration, Ltd. (avail. June

23, 1980).

See also Spirit Mountain Farms

est (avail. February 6, 1978).

In

Sanchez-O'Brien Oil & Gas Corp. (avail. June 23, 1980) the SEC staff granted a

no-action letter with respect to an unregistered foreign offering of general
partnership interests in a domestic general partnership, limited partnership
interests in a German limited partnership and shares of a Netherlands Antilles
corporation, where three of the general partners of the domestic general partnership would be a U.S. corporation, the German limited partnership, and the Netherlands Antilles corporation.
e) Non-U.S. Issuers. Although Release 4708 was directed exclusively to
offerings abroad by U.S. issuers, it should follow a fortiori that the registration requirements of the 1933 Act have no greater application to offerings abroad
by foreign issuers. Indeed, whether any restrictions are needed, and, if so,
what type of restrictions are needed, to prevent distributions in the U.S. or to
U.S. investors of unregistered foreign securities offered abroad would appear to
depend on the attractiveness of the securities to U.S. investors. The more
attractive a foreign issue to U.S. investors, the more prudent it would be for
the foreign issuer to utilize more elaborate procedures designed to assure that
the securities come to rest abroad.
(1) The attractiveness of a foreign offering to U.S. investors may depend on a variety of factors. A market in the U.S. is perhaps more likely to
exist for Canadian issuers than other foreign issuers. Demand for securities
of foreign issuers is also likely to exist in the U.S. if a market already
exists in the U.S. for other securities of the same issuer. Thus it is generally
thought that issuers of Yankee bonds have a heavier obligation to take steps to
prevent their Eurobonds from coming into the hands of U.S. purchasers than is
the case for issuers that have not come into the U.S. market. Whether tilesame
considerations apply to issuers that have sold only commercial paper in the U.S.
is considerably less clear, but practice to date seems to be to attach less
weight to commercial paper issuance. Securities of foreign issuers that conduct
substantial activities in the U.S. may also be more likely to be attractive to
U.S. investors. Traditionally, it has been thought that the same was true of
dollar-denominated or dollar option bonds, but with increasing sophistication
of investors and widespread activities in currency hedging, it may be questioned
whether this rationale continues to be persuasive. The attractiveness of the
foreign issue to U.S. investors may also be increased if the managing underwriters
are affiliated companies of U.S. securities firms or banks or non-U.S. banks or
securities firms that conduct substantial activities in the U.S.
(2) As a practical matter, a variety of approaches has been taken by
foreign issuers in connection with offerings of unregistered Euro-securities.
Certain of these approaches, while less restrictive than the ninety day lock-up
procedures, may nevertheless be "reasonably designed to prevent distribution or
redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United States,"
assuming accurate assessments of the circumstances involving the offerings have
been made. In circumstances in which a significant risk of flow-back to the
U.S. market exists, however, foreign issuers would be well advised to utilize
the ninety day lock-up procedures sanctioned by the SEC staff in its no-action
letters with respect to U.S. dollar denominated Euro-securities of U.S. issuers.
(3) Even in offerings of U.S. dollar obligations, many foreign issuers
have not found it necessary to utilize the ninety day lock-up procedures. Instead, these foreign issuers have found it prudent simply to rely on contractual
restrictions contained in the underwriting documents designed to preclude distribution of the securities in the U.S. or to U.S. investors. Under this contractual restriction approach, the underwriting papers impose on the underwriters,
selling group members, and dealers involved in the distribution, the obligation
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to refrain from offering or selling the securities in the U.S. or to U.S. investors as part of the distribution. In addition, the prospectus indicates that
the securities are not registered under the 1933 Act and are not being offered
or sold in the U.S. or to U.S. investors. Depending upon the circumstances, it
may also be possible for U.S. issuers of non-U.S. dollar denominated obligations
in the Euro-security market to rely on this contractual restriction approach.
(4) With respect to the offering by foreign issuers of Euro-securities
denominated in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, the underwriting papers
may often contain no reference to the U.S. securities laws at all, although
these documents would usually prohibit offers or sales of the securities in
violation of any applicable law.
(5) Nevertheless, as indicated above, certain foreign issuers have
chosen to utilize the ninety day lock-up procedure, while others have chosen
to use a completely different approach that incorporates all the elements of the
contractual restriction approach, but also includes specific restrictions on
secondary market transactions by underwriters and dealers in the U.S. or with
U.S. investors for a period, usually of nine months, following the date of the
closing. Because the U.S. is a natural market for Canadian borrowers, Canadian
issuers of U.S. dollar Euro-securities should generally consider using the
ninety day lock-up procedures. The ninety day lock-up procedures may also be
the prudent approach for other foreign issuers of U.S. dollar Euro-securities,
especially if an established public market for other securities of the issuer
exists in the U.S. (as would be the case if the issuer has issued or guaranteed
Yankee bonds in the U.S., or if the issuer's equity securities are traded on a
U.S. stock exchange or in the U.S. over-the-counter market). Other special circumstances may also indicate that the ninety day lock-up procedures should be
utilized by foreign issuers.
f) Floating Rate Issues. As a matter of practice, one type of foreign
security that is typically issued in the Euro-security market subject to modified
ninety day lock-up procedures are notes or bonds issued with interest rates that
are adjusted periodically based upon the London interbank rate--so-called floating rate securities. Underwriting agreements usually permit offers and sales
of these securities to branches of U.S. banks located outside the U.S. provided
that the branch represents that it is acquiring the securities for its own account
and not with a view to distribution and agrees that if it should dispose of the
securities in the future, it will not offer or sell such securities directly or
indirectly in the U.S. or to U.S. nationals or residents, except that, with the
prior approval of the managers, it may offer or sell such securities to a branch
of a U.S. bank located outside the U.S. provided that the purchasing bank agrees
to similar limits on offers and resales. Unlike fixed-rate notes issued in the
Euro-security market, floating rate Euro-securities usually bear a 1933 Act legend.
In no-action letters, the SEC staff has indicated that in special situations debt
securities may be offered and sold abroad without registration to foreign branches
of U.S. insurance companies and banks that would technically be regarded as U.S.
nationals as long as it is reasonably clear that the securities will come to rest
abroad. The significant factors the SEC staff appears to emphasize in these circumstances are (i) denomination of the debt securities in a non-U.S. dollar currency, (ii) absence of a market in the U.S. for the securities and (iii) the probability that the foreign branch purchaser will hold the securities to maturity.
See, e.g., Dresser Industries Canada, Ltd. (avail. October 31, 1977);
Motor Credit Co. (avail, July 16, 1975),
g) Registering Flow-back on Form S-16.

Ford

In order to avoid utilizing the

complex lock-up procedures described above, some qualified issuers have chosen
instead to register on SEC Form S-16 the potential flow-back of an offering made
outside the U.S. to non-U.S. investors. See Farinon Electric (avail. September
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27, 1976). This method is often used by Canadian issuers in connection with
Canadian offerings where securities of the same class are already registered with
the SEC and traded in the U.S. See Bell Canada, Amendment No. 1 to Registration
Statement on Form S-16, Registration No. 2-63390 (filed February 13, 1979). The
SEC staff apparently has allowed companies to register less than the entire
amount of a foreign offering as long as the amount reasonably expected to be

resold in the U.S., plus an additional cushion of 10-15 percent of the offering,
have been registered. In addition, the SEC staff has permitted registrants to
insert a legend in foreign prospectuses referring to the availability of the S-16

and the documents incorporated therein by reference, rather than requiring registrants to deliver the S-16 prospectus abroad. See also Release No. 33-6240
(September 10, 1980) (certain foreign governments and political subdivisions
thereof are permitted to file annual shelf registration statements on Schedule B
with respect to offerings in the U.S. and potential resales of offerings initially made outside the U.S.); Kingdom of Sweden (avail. September 22, 1980).

h) Simultaneous Private Placements. It is possible that unregistered
securities may be sold in the U.S. during a foreign distribution of such securities in reliance on the so-called private placement exemption contained in Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."
() Release 4708 indicates that the SEC will not integrate (that is,
consider as a single overall transaction) valid private placements of securities
in the U.S. with simultaneous public offerings abroad, thereby subjecting such
private placements to the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of
the 1933 Act.
(2) In cases where a ninety day lock-up is deemed advisable, such simultaneous private placements will ordinarily be prohibited by the terms of the
underwriting or selling group agreement governing the offering of such securities
abroad. As noted above, such agreements typically preclude participants in the
distribution from making any sales of securities to U.S. investors until ninety
days after the offering has been completed abroad and require beneficial owners
of the securities to represent, as of the date the temporary global bond or note
is exchanged for definitive certificates, that they are not nationals or residents of the U.S.
i) References: See Pergam, Eurocurrency Financing: Securities Law Considerations for U.S. Corporate Issuers in Fordham Corporate Law Institute,
Financing in the International Capital Market, at 241-93 (1980) [hereinafter
Fordham Institute]; Spencer, Ioving with the Flow: World Capital Formation and
the United States Securities Laws, in Fordham Institute at 76-80.
2. Trading Unregistered Euro-securities in the U.S. Market
How soon after the commencement of an unregistered offering of U.S. or
foreign securities outside the U.S. to non-U.S. nationals or residents may
broker-dealers commence trading such securities in the U.S.? As described above,
the registration provisions of the 1933 Act prohibit any offers or sales of
securities when jurisdictional means are utilized unless a registration statement is in effect with respect to such securities or an exemption from registration exists. By its terms, therefore, the 1933 Act applies both to primary
and secondary offerings of securities.
a) Dealer's Exemption
(1) One exemption from registration that may be relied on by broker-
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dealers to commence trading in the U.S. in unregistered securities issued abroad
is Section 4(3) of the 1933 Act--the so-called dealer's exemption. It would
appear from a literal reading of Section 4(3)(A) of the 1933 Act (set forth above
in paragraph A.l.b.) that the earliest time a dealer that is not a statutory undezrriter should be able to trade in the U.S. in unregistered securities issued
abroad would be forty (or perhaps ninety) days after such securities were first
offered to the public abroad, provided that such securities are not part of such
dealer's unsold allotment. Although this section appears to be the basis upon
which the ninety day lock-up procedures described above were derived, the ninety
day lock-up procedures for debt offerings, unlike the dealer's exemption, measure
the ninety day period from the time the managing underwriter determines that the
distribution has been completed abroad, rather than first offered abroad.
(2) One case, however, appears to indicate that the dealer's exemption
should not apply until after the securities had first been illegally offered to
the public in the U.S. See SEC v. North American Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F.
Supp. 106, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 424 F.2d 63, 81
n.14 (2d Cir. 1970). Moreover, the legislative history can be read to support
this interpretation that Section 4(3)(A) applies only to unlawful distributions
of securities as to which registration statements should have been filed, in
contrast to unregistered distributions of securities as to which the registration
requirements of the 1933 Act did not apply. See Sen. Rep. No. 1036 at 14, H. Rep.
No. 1542 at 22, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); SEC Release No. 33-4726 n.3 (1964).
Under this interpretation of Section 4(3)(A), the forty (or ninety) day period
would not begin to run with respect to securities lawfully offered to non-U.S.
residents or nationals abroad without registration under the 1933 Act until such
securities were first illegally introduced into the U.S. market. See also Legal
Problems of Issuing and Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States, in
International Financing and Investment at 450-51 (McDaniels ed. 1964); Cohen &
Throop, Investment of Piivate Capital in Foreign Securities, in Lawyer's Guide to
International Business Transactions at 585-86 (Surrey & Shaw eds. 1963).
(3) Notwithstanding the authorities referred to above, the restrictive
reading of Section 4(3)(A) cannot be correct. It makes no sense to afford more
favorable treatment to unregistered securities illegally offered in the U.S. than
to unregistered securities legally offered abroad to non-U.S. residents or nationals. As a matter of policy, the dealer's exemption must be available at
some point to permit secondary trading in securities issued in lawful exempt
transactions. In fact, absent the applicability of the dealer's exemption to
legally offered unregistered securities, dealers would be unable to deposit foreign securities in return for American Depository Receipts (ADRs) unless in
every case the underlying securities deposited had been registered under the
1933 Act. The fact that issuers offering securities abroad, which are traded
in the U.S. in the form of ADRs, often choose to register with the SEC only a
portion of the offering (a practice long sanctioned by the SEC staff) lends further support to the argument that the dealer's exemption should not be given such
a restrictive reading. Under these circumstances, dealers would be acting at
risk when trading in the securities in the U.S. at a time when they were prohibited from trading in the unregistered portion of the offering because they would
be unable to distinguish the registered portion of the offering from the unregistered portion. This would not make sense because at that time a registration
statement with respect to the securities would have been filed with the SEC and
prospectuses disseminated in the U.S., thus satisfying the 1933 Act's disclosure
policies.
b) The SIA Proposal. In 1974, the Securities Industry
proposed that the SEC issue a release to create a presumption,
underwritten distributions abroad of straight debt obligations
that a U.S. broker-dealer would be participating in an illegal
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the U.S. if it sold the security in the U.S. or to a U.S. national or resident
within ninety days after the initial offering of such securities abroad. See
Williams, Trading in the United States in Foreign Securities Distributed Outside
the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, in
Sixth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (PLI) 327, 348-49 (1975).
Although the SEC declined to accept the SIA's proposal as presented, the SEC subsequently considered adopting an objective test to replace the imprecise and
vague coming to rest doctrine. See "Is the SEC a Barrier to New York's Role
in International Finance?" Address by SEC Chairman Garrett, in Securities Regulation & Law Rptr. (BNA), No. 257, at D-1 (June 19, 1974); letter of Carl T.
Bodolus, Chief, Office of International Corporate Finance, to Nichael H. Coles,
Chairman, International Finance Committee at the SIA, dated February 26, 1976.
See also Cardiodynamics, Inc. (avail. July 5, 1974). This effort to create
objective guidelines appears, however, to have been abandoned.
c) Seasoning Period
(1) Although the ninety day lock-up procedures appear to be sufficient
to convince the SEC staff not to take enforcement against an issuer or underwriting group in connection with unregistered offerings abroad of securities to
non-U.S. investors, the SEC staff has not conceded that unregistered securities
issued abroad may be resold in the U.S. without violating the 1933 Act after the
expiration of the ninety day lock-up period. Moreover, because of the uncertainties that exist with respect to the applicability of the dealer's exemption to
the secondary trading in the U.S. of unregistered securities that had been issued
abroad, and because the dealer's exemption does not come into play if the dealer
is deemed to be acting as an underwriter with respect to such securities or as
a participant in their distribution, many U.S. broker-dealers have developed
internal seasoning guidelines to determine when trading may commence in the U.S.
in unregistered foreign securities. These seasoning guidelines are adopted as
a matter of prudence and are designed to reduce the risk that when trading such
unregistered securities in the U.S. the broker-dealer would be involved in the
chain of distribution and therefore would be acting, in effect, as an underwriter
or other participant in the distribution because such securities had never in
fact come to rest abroad. At least in the case of debt securities, the seasoning
period is usually considerably longer than the ninety day lock-up period contractually agreed to by underwriters participating in foreign distributions of U.S.
securities in part because of the fear that foreign distribution practices may
inadvertently result in a U.S. broker-dealer purchasing unregistered securities
that constitute an underwriter's or dealer's unsold allotment.
(2) As a matter of practice, therefore, U.S. brokerage firms generally
restrict trading in unregistered debt securities issued abroad for nine months
to one year after the completion of the distribution abroad. The nine months to
one year seasoning period apparently has been derived by analogy to Rule 147 under the 1933 Act. Rule 147 provides a safe harbor for issuers raising capital
from local sources in reliance on the exemption for intrastate offerings provided
by Section 3(a)(ll) of the 1933 Act. One condition to the applicability of Rule
147 relates to resales of unregistered securities that had originally been offered
only to residents of the same state in which the issuer is a resident. Paragraph
(e) of Rule 147 prescribes a nine month period from the date of the last sale by
the issuer during which resales of such securities may only be made to persons
resident within the same state. This nine month rule, therefore, represents the
SEC's attempt to define the time period necessary to assure that securities, which
had been issued in an exempt intrastate offering, have come to rest.
(3) One way for U.S. broker-dealers to
soning guidelines would be to place unseasoned
in reliance on the private placement exemption
1933 Act. Such sales would need to be limited
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who must represent that they do not intend to distribute the securities to U.S.
investors and will not resell in the U.S. or to U.S. investors absent registration or an exemption from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. With
respect to securities of foreign issuers, however, it may be difficult to structure such transactions to conform to traditional private placement standards,
if, for example, tilepurchaser does not have direct access to the issuer or its
agent for information and negotiation of terms.
(4) In sum, the problem is that the 1933 Act applies to the distribution
of securities to the investing U.S. public, that the dealer's exemption, as a
practical matter, is applicable only to secondary trading of securities already
distributed (that is, which have come to rest in the hands of the investing public), but that the 1933 Act, the case law, and the SEC offer no objective guidance for determining when a distribution is complete and the securities have
come to rest so as to permit secondary trading without violation of the 1933 Act.
Tile adoption by the SEC of rules prescribing objective seasoning criteria could
promote uniform treatment by U.S. broker-dealers of the problem of secondary
trading in the U.S. of unregistered securities that had been issued abroad and
could eliminate the competitive pressures that may now exist among U.S. brokerdealers and may encourage them to cheat on their own self-imposed seasoning rules
or to adopt increasingly lenient standards.
d) Tracing Problems. Tile 1933 Act's registration requirements apply only
to the specific securities involved in a public offering and not to the entire
class of an issuer's securities. See Sen. Rep. No. 1036 at 20-21 and H. Rep. No.
1542 at 29-30, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); I L. Loss, Securities Regulation
259-60 (1961); IV L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2577-78, 2658 (1969). Cf. Barnes
v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d (2d Cir. 1967). Because the 1933 Act does not employ a
fungibility rule (i.e., does not equate already outstanding securities and those
subject to a new public offering), a broker-dealer is permitted to continue to
trade previously outstanding securities of the class even though tileissuer is
simultaneously engaged in distributing additional unregistered securities of tile
same class in the Euro-security market to non-U.S. nationals or residents. As
a practical matter, however, at least with respect to straight equity securities
such as common stock, the broker-dealer may decide to cease trading all securities of that class in the U.S. because it would be impossible for it to distinguish between the issuer's previously outstanding shares and those issued in the
unregistered foreign distribution. The problem, of course, is that equity
securities, principally common shares, are often issued as part of an ever-increasing single class and are typically traded on an auction market where the
purchaser has no way of knowing the identity of his seller or tracing the origin
of the securities purchased. Foreign offerings of debt securities, in contrast,
are not usually fungible with other indebtedness issued by the same company
(that is, each offering usually constitutes a clearly separate and different
class), and the buyer of debt securities almost always would be in a position to
know the identity of the seller or the seller's agent. This is not to say, however, that tracing will always be a problem even for common shares. For example,
when new shares are not physically issued until a substantial period of time
after the initial offering (see, e.g., The British Petroleum Company, Ltd. (avail.
July 14, 1977)) the newly issued shares (or receipt in lieu thereof) will be
readily distinguishable from previously outstanding shares. Similarly, the new
shares will be easily distinguishable in cases where the new shares have different
initial dividend rights from the previously outstanding shares so that the two
kinds of shares would not be fungible in practice for some time after the initial
offering. In such circumstances, obviously, no tracing problem exists, and trading should be able to continue in tileold shares.
(1) In Release 4708, the SEC indicated that if a distribution of securities by a U.S. corporation is made abroad without registration to non-U.S. investors "dealers may trade in other securities of the same class in the United
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States without regard to the time limitation of the dealer's exemption in Section
[4(3)]." The SEC did state, however, that if active trading developed in the
U.S. in the securities subject to the foreign offering during or shortly after

the distribution abroad, the implication may arise that "a portion of the distribution was in fact being made by means of such trading."
(2) If a market in ADRs exists in the U.S., precautions may be taken by
the ADR depository to insure that trading in the ADRs simultaneously with a new
unregistered distribution of the underlying securities abroad will relate solely
to the previously outstanding shares. Typically, ADR depositories refuse to
accept deposits of any shares of a class of securities subject to an unregistered
public offering outside the U.S. for at least ninety days after the offering date
(rather than the completion-of-distribution date). The ninety day period appears
to be based in part on the dealer's exemption and in part on the seasoning concepts developed by broker-dealers to determine when a foreign issue has come to
rest abroad. After ninety days, the depository would contact the managing underwriter to inquire whether the distribution had been completed. If the distribution had been completed, the depository would begin to accept deposits of underlying shares. If the manager is unable to represent that the distribution has
been completed because of lack of knowledge (as opposed to the representation
not being true), the depository might begin accepting deposits after ninety days,
but would continue to monitor the trading activities in the U.S. and foreign
markets. If a large amount of securities were being deposited for ADRs, the
depository might then suspend deposits for an additional period of time. See
J. Stevenson and W. Williams, Jr., A Lawyer's Guide to International Business
Transactions, United States Legal Aspects of International Securities Transactions, Pt. III, Folio 5 at 80-81 (1980). As a result, an arbitrageur would not
be able freely to arbitrage price differences between the foreign and U.S. market
until the depository bank began to accept deposits of such securities at least
ninety days after the foreign offering commenced. (See the discussion of ADR
arbitrage in paragraph A.2.f. infra.)
(3) The SEC staff has also occasionally suggested that the 1933 Act's
registration requirements would apply to sales into the U.S. of previously outstanding securities shortly before or during an unregistered offering in a foreign market of additional securities of the same class if the seller expected to
replace the shares sold with substituted shares purchased in the unregistered
distribution abroad. This position, if sustained, would require broker-dealers
executing sale orders in the U.S. to inquire whether the seller intended to replace some or all of the position by purchasing shares in the unregistered offering. Requiring the registration of such previously outstanding shares in this
context, however, would be inconsistent with the accepted view that the concept
of fungibility does not apply to the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
As noted above, only the specific securities involved in a public offering and

not the entire class of such securities are subject to the 1933 Act's registratioi
requirements. Thus, where adequate precautions have been taken by the ADR depository banks, U.S. broker-dealers should be able to continue trading in previously outstanding securities in the U.S. notwithstanding the existence of a
simultaneous unregistered public offering abroad.
e) Broker-Dealer's Duty of Inquiry
(1) Notwithstanding the general seasoning guidelines U.S. broker-dealers
may choose to follow in connection with the purchase of unregistered securities
that have been issued in the Euro-security market, the SEC takes the position
that U.S. broker-dealers must bear the responsibility to inquire into the particular facts and circumstances surrounding any such purchase. See Release No.
33-5168 (July 7, 1971); Release No. 33-4445 (February 2, 1962). In effect, the
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SEC is using its regulatory power over U.S. broker-dealers to act as policemen
in this area, with the support of broad language drawn from several judicial
decisions involving egregious fact situations. The U.S. broker-dealer community
has in general accepted this role, not only because of the SEC's regulatory
authority over them, but also out of an awareness that if a pattern of abuse
(i.e., widespread violations of the 1933 Act) were to develop it would likely
lead to additional statutory or rulemaking action which might destroy the secondary market in the U.S. for foreign-issued securities.
(2) At least with respect to debt issues that are not usually traded
abroad in an anonymous auction market, a U.S. broker-dealer will ordinarily be
in the position to know the identity of its seller or the seller's agent, and if
the seller or its agent has acted as an underwriter or a selling group member in
the initial Eurobond offering, the broker-dealer should want to know whether the
securities it would be purchasing were in fact part of the seller's unsold allotment. The broker-dealer might also want to know whether the securities being
purchased had been placed in a managed account by the seller. If the securities
are being purchased at an abnormal discount, this too might indicate that the
broker-dealer might be participating in an underwriter's discount and therefore
be participating in a distribution of the securities in the U.S. In sum, any
number of factors could put the U.S. broker-dealer on notice that a particular
purchase of unregistered Euro-securities, even after a seasoning period, involved
a distribution of such securities in the U.S. in violation of the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements of the 1933 Act.
f) One Application of the Pzoblem: ADR Arbitrage. One example of the
problem of trading unregistered foreign securities in the U.S. market occurs in
the context of arbitraging foreign securities issued outside the U.S. with ADRs
actively traded in the U.S. U.S. broker-dealers engage in arbitrage transactions
based on the price differential existing in foreign markets with respect to foreign securities and in the U.S. market for ADRs representing such securities.
During the period following an unregistered public distribution of the underlying
securities outside the U.S. (whether or not in connection with a simultaneous
registered public offering of such securities in the U.S.), a broker-dealer might
purchase the underlying securities abroad and contemporaneously sell a corresponding number of ADRs in the U.S., deposit the underlying securities with the ADR
depository in return for the ADRs and then deliver the ADRs to the purchaser in
the U.S.
Assuming that the broker-dealer purchased for its own account the underlying securities in open market transactions abroad under circumstances where the
broker-dealer could not readily distinguish between newly-issued and previouslyissued outstanding shares, did not know or have reason to know the identity of
the seller and had no arrangement or understanding with a third party regarding
the distribution or redistribution of the underlying securities, the broker-dealer
should be able to engage in such arbitrage transactions some reasonable time after
the commencement of the distribution abroad. Broker-dealers might even engage in
such transactions ninety days after completion of the distribution abroad in
reliance on the dealer's exemption, but such practice would involve a greater
risk than if a longer seasoning period were used. The conceptual question, of
course, is whether the broker-dealer would be deemed to be an underwriter (and
thus not eligible for the dealer's exemption) by reason of its unwitting purchase
of the underlying securities from the issuer or a control person because the 1933
Act defines the term underwriter as a person who makes such a purchase "with a
view to . . . the distribution" of such security. But if the broker-dealer effected the purchase on a foreign stock exchange or other anonymous auction market in circumstances in which it could not know the identity of the seller and
it in fact had not agreed to and was not acting with the intention of facilitating
the distribution, the broker-dealer would not in fact be acting "with a view to
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. . . the distribution," should not be considered an underwriter and should not
thereby lose the ability to rely on the dealer's exemption. Cf. Release 33-5168
(1971) ("Where it appears that securities to be sold were not acquired by openmarket purchases, it must be determined whether their sale is exempted from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933.").
But see Tomlinson, Federal
Regulation of Secondary Trading in Foreign Securities, 32 Business Lawyer 463,
475 (1977) (arbitrageurs required to determine source of purchase even in openmarket transactions).
g) Applicability of Rule 144 to Resales of Euro-securities. To what
extent is Rule 144 under the 1933 Act available with respect to resales in the
U.S. or to U.S. investors of securities that had been acquired by non-U.S. investors in unregistered foreign offerings? Rule 144 provides a safe-harbor for
the resale of restricted securities of an issuer. If all the conditions of the
Rule are met, the seller will not be deemed to be an underwriter engaged in a
distribution of securities as to which a registration statement was not in effect.
In general, the Rule imposes holding period limitations and notice limitations
on sellers of restricted securities and requires that sales be made in broker's
transactions or transactions directly with a market maker. In addition, certain
current public information must be available with respect to the issuer.
(1) Because paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 144 defines the term restricted
securities to mean "securities acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer
thereof, or from an affiliate of the issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering," the SEC staff initially took the
position that Rule 144 does not apply to resales of securities distributed in
unregistered foreign offerings to non-U.S. investors in reliance on Release 4708
because such offerings are actually public offerings. See Alden Self-Transit
Systems (avail. January 7, 1977); Foote, Cone & Belding Comnunications, Inc.
(avail. May 6, 1976); Wertpapierdienst GmbH (avail. September 14, 1973); The
First-Artists Production Co. (avail. September 1, 1972). Even under these interpretations, however, it would appear that Rule 144 could apply to resales of
such unregistered securities if they had been privately placed outside the U.S.
with the non-U.S. investors if precautions similar to U.S. private placement
procedures have been taken.
(2) For policy reasons, however, the SEC staff more recently appears to
have reversed its position and is now willing to grant a no-action letter with
respect to resales of unregistered securities that had been initially offered
abroad in a public offering in reliance on Release 4708 if the procedures specified in Rule 144 are followed. See International Income Property, Inc. (avail.
December 12, 1980); Toth Aluminum Corp. (avail. January 14, 1980); Toth Aluminum
Corp. (avail. January 23, 1978); Toth Aluminum Corp. (avail. December 6, 1976);
Toth Aluminum Corp. (avail. February 9, 1976); Ferronics Inc. (avail. April 24,
1974). With respect to such resales, however, the SEC staff has imposed the requirement that only domestic broker-dealers may be utilized by the foreign investors to complete the sales. See International Income Property, Inc. (avail.
December 12, 1980); Wertpapierdienst GmbH (avail. September 14, 1973). At least
with respect to resales by foreign investors that are not affiliates of the issuer,
this latter restriction no longer applies due to the addition of paragraph (k) to
Rule 144, which eliminates the amount limitation, and notice and manner of sale
requirements of Rule 144 for certain non-affiliated persons. See Release No.
33-6286 (February 6, 1981).
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B.

Manipulation of the United States Market Through Trading
in Foreign Markets During Distributions of Securities

SEC Rules lOb-6, lOb-7 and lOb-8, issued pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended [the 1934 Act], set forth the principles applied
by the SEC to determine whether activities by persons participating in a distribution of securities, or in stabilizing in connection therewith, are manipulative
or deceptive. These rules were intended to prevent illegitimate market activities by participants in distributions designed only to inflate artificially the
market price of securities being distributed. See Release No. 34-5040 (May 18,
1954) (proposed rules); Release No. 34-5159 (April 19, 1955) (revised proposals);
Release No. 34-5194 (July 5, 1955) (rules adopted).
Even though these market manipulation rules are triggered only by the use
of the means of interstate commerce, the SEC has applied these rules to foreign
market transactions by foreign underwriters during distributions because of the
participation in such distributions of U.S. broker-dealers and presumably because
of the SEC's concern that such foreign market activities will have an effect on
the U.S. market. See Brownell, Cohen, Heller, Loss and Stevenson, Legal Problems
of Issuing and Marketing Foreign Securities in the United States, in International Financing and Investment 454-60 (McDaniels, ed. 1964); Cohen & Throop, Investment of Private Capital in Foreign Securities, in Surrey and Shaw, A Lawyer's
Guide to International Business Transactions 567-72 (1963); VI L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 3777 (1969). The position of the SEC in this area, however, has been
developed in only a few no-action letters issued by the SEC staff. The details
of these no-action letters appear to have been bargained out on a more-or-less
ad hoc basis or to have been derived from ready-made proposals submitted by the
interested parties, which may have conceded more than was necessary in order to
obtain the blessing of the SEC staff. W4hen imposing its market manipulation
concepts on the activities of foreigners in foreign markets, therefore, the SEC
has not appeared to appreciate the fact that different countries may have developed different notions about how their securities markets should operate, nor
has the SEC directly addressed the substantive question of whether the principal
U.S. market for a security, in particular an equity security, can ever be effectively manipulated by trading the security in foreign satellite markets.
1.

Rule lOb-6

Rule lOb-6 restricts trading activities by persons who are participating
or who expect to participate in a distribution. Rule lOb-6 prohibits underwriters,
dealers, issuers, and other participants in distributions of securities from
bidding for, purchasing, or attempting to induce others to purchase such securities, securities of the same class or series as those being distributed, rights
to purchase such securities, or securities into which the distributed securities
are immediately convertible or exchangeable until after their participations in
such distributions have been completed. Rule lOb-6 contains a number of exceptions for transactions not considered to be manipulative or deceptive, including
transactions effected in accordance with the requirements of Rules lOb-7 and lOb-8.
By its terms, Rule lOb-6 applies to such bids or purchases only if they
are made "directly or indirectly by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange." Nonetheless, the SEC has applied the rule to trading transactions
in foreign markets during simultaneous distributions of securities in the U.S.
and in foreign markets and even during distributions abroad of securities actively
traded in the U.S. when such distributions were not simultaneously occurring in
the U.S.
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a) In connection with a registered secondary offering of securities of a
U.S. corporation, the SEC staff granted an exemption from Rule lOb-6 to permit
European participants in the distribution to purchase such securities outside the
U.S. prior to and during the distribution. It was represented that the U.S.
market was the principal market for trading the corporation's securities and that
the volume of trading in such securities outside the U.S. was inconsequential.
It was also represented that most European shareholders effected transactions in
such securities in New York, and the prices at which transactions were effected
abroad were primarily determined by the New York quotes.

The SEC staff granted

the exemption from Rule lOb-6 subject to the conditions that the European underwriters did not purchase or sell the corporation's securities in the U.S. or to
or from U.S. residents or nationals and did not effect transactions for the "purpose of creating actual or apparent active trading in or raising the price of the
stock." S.S. Kresge Co. (avail. May 14, 1972).
b) The British Petroleum Company, Ltd. (avail. July 14, 1977) involved

simultaneous secondary distributions of BP common shares to the public in the
U.S. and in Great Britain. The U.S. offering in the form of ADRs, expected to
represent approximately twenty-five percent of the securities offered, was registered with the SEC, while the U.K. offering was not. The primary market for the
BP shares was on The Stock Exchange, London, but ADRs for such shares were actively traded in the U.S. The U.K. underwriters had agreed to purchase any unsold
securities from the selling shareholder, and, in turn, to resell such shares to
U.K. and foreign sub-underwriters. Unlike the foreign sub-underwriters who were
likely to redistribute the shares they purchased, the U.K. sub-underwriters were
expected to hold such shares for investment and not for distribution and were not
expected to be acting as a group. The U.K. underwriters had agreed not to bid
for or purchase any BP security for their accounts until after the earlier of the
completion of the distribution of BP stock by the U.S. underwriters or thirty
days from the commencement of the U.S. offering. The SEC staff granted an exemption from Rule lOb-6 to permit the U.K. underwriters to induce purchases of BP
shares by others if such transactions were in the ordinary course of business and
not for the purpose of creating actual or apparent trading in or raising the price
of any BP securities. Owing to the fact that market transactions by sub-underwriters acting independently during the offering period were a standard part of
the U.K. distribution system, the trading activities of the U.K. sub-underriters
were not restricted at all during the U.S. distribution, but the foreign subunderwriters (as well as the U.S. underwriters, of course) were required to comply with the trading restrictions of Rule lOb-6.
c) The British Petroleum Company, Ltd. (avail. December 1, 1979) involved
a secondary offering of BP shares only in the U.K. where nationals or residents
of other countries, including the U.S., would be permitted to submit applications
pursuant to the offer subject to certain conditions. Because of the "close relationship between the U.K. and the U.S. markets for BP shares," the BP shares sold
in the U.K. underwriting were registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act even
though the underwriters and sub-underwriters were required to represent that they
were not acquiring shares for redistribution in the U.S. or to residents or nationals of the U.S. The SEC staff granted an exemption to permit the U.K. underwriters to induce others to purchase BP securities on similar conditions to those
specified with respect to the 1977 offering described above, and agreed not to
recommend enforcement action if the U.K. sub-underwriters engaged in trading
activities during the distribution.

Trading activities during the distribution

by foreign sub-underwriters and the participating U.K. affiliates of U.S. brokerdealers, however, were not exempt from Rule lOb-6.
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d) Dominion Securities Ltd. (avail. April 13, 1980) involved a request
for a no-action letter or an exemption from Rule lOb-6 by Canadian investment
dealers with respect to their trading activities in Canada at a time when they
would be soliciting proxies with respect to the proposed amalgamation of two
Canadian companies to be effected by means of an exchange offer. The acquiring
company was a reporting company under Section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, and the
target's common shares, approximately thirteen percent of which were held by
U.S. residents, were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and primarily traded
on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The Canadian dealers agreed not to solicit
proxies from U.S. residents or effect transactions for the purpose of creating
actual or apparent trading in or raising the price of either companies' securities. The SEC staff granted an exemption from Rule 1Ob-6 to permit the Canadian
dealers to continue trading activities in the securities of the amalgamating
companies during tiletime the dealers solicited proxies for approval of the
amalgamation, subject to the following conditions: (i) No bids for or purchases
of either companies' securities could be made in the U.S. or from any U.S. resident or national other than on a Canadian stock exchange; (ii) With respect to
purchases on a Canadian exchange, no purchase or bid could be effected until
after an independent opening transaction or within the last half hour of trading
and no purchases could be effected at a price higher than the higher of the
highest independent bid price or last sale price; and (iii) Dominion must submit
weekly to the SEC lists of purchases of such securities made by the dealers
setting forth the number of shares purchased and applicable purchase prices
during the preceding week.
e) Additional Reference: See Johnson, Application of Federal Securities
Laws to International Securities Transactions, in Fordham Institute at 163-67.
2.

Rule lOb-7

A few no-action letters issued by the SEC staff under Rule lOb-7 also
illustrate the attempt by the SEC to require foreign market practices during
distributions to conform to U.S. concepts of fairness and freedom from manipulation. Rule lOb-7 sets forth the conditions under which underwriters may make
stabilizing bids or purchases in order to prevent or retard a decline in the open
market price of a security during a distribution of such security. By its terms,
Rule lOb-7 proscribes stabilizing activities not conducted in compliance with
the rule only if effected "directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange." The SEC, however, has apparently asserted
jurisdiction over foreign stabilizing activities because of the possible collateral effects of such activities on the U.S. market. Perhaps this theory can be
justified if a foreign market is the principal trading market for a security that
is also traded in the U.S. Where the principal trading market for the security
is in the U.S., however, the theory may be less justifiable.
a) In Alcan Aluminum Ltd. (avail. June 26, 1976), the SEC staff issued
a no-action letter in connection with the simultaneous public offerings in the
U.S. and Canada of shares of a Canadian company. The principal market for such
shares was the New York Stock Exchange. The offering price of the shares to be
offered in Canada was to be determined by converting the U.S. offering price at
the prevailing exchange rate, but due to the fluctuations in the exchange rate
during the simultaneous offerings, the underwriters proposed to raise the level
of the stabilizing bids made in the Canadian market to reflect a decrease in the
value of the Canadian dollar with respect to the U.S. dollar or, if a Canadian
bid had been reduced to reflect an increase in the value of the Canadian dollar
with respect to the U.S. dollar, to raise the bid to reflect a subsequent decrease in the value of the Canadian dollar with respect to the U.S. dollar. The
SEC staff took the position that it would not recommend enforcement action with
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respect to such increases in the Canadian stabilizing bids, subject to the following conditions:
i) A Canadian stabilizing bid may be increased only to the
extent necessary to reflect a change in the adjusted exchange rate;
(ii) No Canadian stablizing bid shall be entered at a price
above the higher of (a) the then current highest independent bid
price for Alcan common shares in the market in which such bid is
entered (or, in the case of the Canadian over-the-counter market,
the then current highest independent bid price for Alcan common
shares on either of the Montreal or Toronto Stock Exchanges), or
(b) if the then current lowest independent offer price for Alcan
common shares in the market in which such bid is entered is above
the last sale price for Alcan common shares in that market, the
price of such last sale;
(iii) In no event shall any Canadian stablizing bid be entered
or maintained at a price in excess of the price in Canadian dollars
(determined by the adjusted exchange rate) at which a stabilizing
bid (if any) for Alcan common shares is then maintained on the
NYSE in accordance with the requirements of Rule lOb-7 (the NYSE
stabilizing bid), provided, however, that no such Canadian stabilizing bid need be reduced as a consequence of a change in the adjusted
exchange rate unless, in the absence of a reduction, that bid would
exceed the price of the NYSE stabilizing bid by 1/8th of a Canadian
dollar or more;
(iv) To the extent a Canadian stabilizing bid must be rounded
up or down to the nearest 1/8th of a Canadian dollar after a change
in the adjusted exchange rate or to comply with condition (iii),
supra, in order to comply with the practice of trading securities
at increments of 1/8th of a Canadian dollar prevailing in any
Canadian market, such bid shall be rounded down; and
(v) Stabilizing in Alcan common shares is otherwiae conducted
in accordance with applicable provisions of Rule lOb-7.
b) Tricentrol Ltd. (avail. August 2, 1980) involved the underwriting of
American Depository Shares of a U.K. company in the U.S. and Canada and, as a
result, raised similar issues to those in the Alcan no-action letter except that
stabilizing bids were to be made in the U.S., Canadian and London markets. The
Stock Exchange, London was the principal market for the underlying securities,
and the initial U.S. offering price was to be determined by reference to quotations on the London Exchange converted from pounds sterling to U.S. dollars.
The initial Canadian offering price would equal the U.S. dollar offering price
converted to Canadian dollars. The SEC staff took a no-action position to permit
increases in the Canadian and London stabilizing bids to reflect decreases in the
value of the Canadian dollar or pound sterling with respect to the U.S. dollar.
subject to conditions similar to those specified in the Alcan letter, as follows:
(i) A Canadian Stabilizing Bid or a London Stabilizing Bid
[may be] increased only to the extent necessary to reflect a change
in the Current Exchange Rate.
(ii) No Canadian Stabilizing Bid shall be entered in the
Canadian over-the-counter market at a price higher than the then
current highest independent bid price for ADSs in such market.
After listing on the Toronto Exchange, no such bid shall be entered in the Canadian over-the-counter market at a price higher
than the then current highest independent bid for ADSs on such
exchange.
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(iii) No Canadian Stabilizing Bid shall be entered on the
Toronto Stock Exchange at a price above the higher of (A) the
then current highest independent bid price for ADSs on such
exchange, or (B) the last sale price for ADSs on such exchange
if the then current lowest independent asked price for ADSs is
above the last sale price.
(iv) No London Stabilizing Bid shall be entered at a price
above the higher of (A) the then current highest independent bid
price for the Ordinary Shares on The Stock Exchange in London,
or (B) the last sale price for Ordinary Shares on such exchange
if the then current lowest independent asked price for Ordinary
Shares (on such exchange is equal to or higher than the last reported sale price for Ordinary Shares on such exchange].
(v) In no event shall any Canadian Stabilizing Bid be entered or maintained at a price in excess of the United States
dollar equivalent in Canadian dollars (determined by applying the
Current Exchange Rate) of a U.S. Stabilizing Bid then being maintained in the principal market in the United States in accordance
with Rule lOb-7; provided, however, that the Canadian Stabilizing
Bid need not be reduced after a change in the Current Exchange
Rate unless, in the absence of a reduction, that bid (A) if entered in the Canadian over-the-counter market, would exceed the
U.S. Stabilizing Bid by $.05 Canadian or more, or (B) if entered
on the Toronto Stock Exchange, would exceed the U.S. Stabilizing
Bid by $.125 Canadian or more.
(vi) In no event shall any London Stabilizing Bid be entered
or maintained at a price in excess of the United States dollar
equivalent in pounds sterling (determined by applying the Current
Exchange Rate) of a U.S. Stabilizing Bid then being maintained in
the principal market in the United States in accordance with Rule
lOb-7, as adjusted for the fact that one ADS represents two Ordinary Shares; provided, however, that the London Stabilizing Bid
need not be reduced after a change in the Current Exchange Rate
unless, in the absence of a reduction, such bid would exceed the
U.S. Stabilizing Bid by two English pence or more.
(vii) If, in entering or adjusting a Canadian Stabilizing Bid
or a London Stabilizing Bid to comply with conditions (v) or (vi),
supra, or after a change in the Current Exchange Rate, it is
necessary to round such bids, or any of them, in order to conform
them, or any of them, to the practice prevailing (A) in the Canadian
over-the-counter market, of trading securities at increments of $.01
Canadian, (B) on the Toronto Stock Exchange, of trading securities
at increments of $.125 Canadian, or (C) on The Stock Exchange in
London, of trading securities at increments of one English pence,
then such bid or bids shall be rounded down.
(viii) Stabilization of ADSs and Ordinary Shares is otherwise
conducted in accordance with Rule lOb-7.
c) In Mutsumi Ohta (avail. September 1, 1972), the SEC staff refused to
express an opinion whether Rule lOb-7 would apply to stabilizing bids made by the
managing underwriter of a Japanese syndicate on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with
respect to securities being distributed only in Japan, where the issuer's securities were listed on the New York Stock Exchange as well as the Tokyo Stok
Exchange.
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d) Additional References: See Liftin, Concurrent Financing in U.S.
and Foreign Markets, Case Study: Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A., in Fordham

Institute at 543-51, describing a concurrent registered offering in Mexico and
the U.S. by two separate underwriting syndicates, in which the Mexican underwriters had agreed to comply with the requirements of SEC Rules lOb-6, lob-7 and
17a-2. A recent prospectus concerning an offering of common stock of Genstar
Limited, a Canadian corporation, by separate underwriting syndicates of Canadian
and U.S. underwriters, indicates that the offering may have been stabilized on
the New York, Toronto, Montreal, Alberta, Vancouver, Brussels, Antwerp, Basle,
Geneva and Zurich stock exchanges. The Canadian underwriters and selling group
members agreed that their stabilizing activities would be conducted at the direction of the lead U.S. underwriter, and that they would comply with the requirements of SEC Rules lOb-6, lOb-7 and 17a-2. See also Klein, Rights Offerings,
"Going Private," and Stock Repurchases by Foreign Private Issuers, in Fordham
Institute at 489-92.

C.

Applicability of Other 1934 Act Rules to Insider Trading in
Foreign Markets

1. Rule lob-5
Promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, Rule lOb-5
provides
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
As interpreted, Rule lOb-5 has been viewed to prohibit, in addition to more traditional fraudulent and manipulative schemes, any purchase or sale of securities
based upon material non-public information. Thus, anyone in possession of such
information must either disclose such information to the other party in the
transaction or refrain from trading the securities. With respect to transactions
involving inside information effected in foreign markets, subject matter jurisdiction will not exist under Rule lOb-5 unless the defendant utilized some means
of interstate commerce or the mails.

See Sinva v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

a Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (commodity transactions effected
by foreigners in foreign markets not subject to 1934 Act). Where the defendant
is a U.S. person or a U.S. corporation, however, the interstate commerce test will
most likely be easily satisfied, unlike the situation where foreign broker-dealers
without U.S. contacts conduct the transactions wholly abroad.
a) General Principles of the Extraterritorial Reach of Rule lOb-5

(1) When delineating the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions
of the 1934 Act, and in particular Rule lOb-5, U.S. courts have not always applied
consistent principles of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in general, U.S. courts have
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applied Rule lOb-5 to international securities transactions if either (i) significant activities took place in the U.S. in connection with a transaction having
consequences solely outside of the U.S. (e.g., affecting only non-U.S. investors)
or (ii) activities took place solely outside the U.S. in connection with a transaction having a substantial effect within the U.S. These two tests of subject
matter jurisdiction are based upon the objective and the subjective principles
of jurisdiction expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States [the Restatement].
(a) As set forth in Section 18 of the Restatement, the objective principle of
jurisdiction entitles U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction with respect to foreign
conduct having substantial, direct and foreseeable effects within the U.S.:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the
territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v.
Schoenbaum 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the Second Circuit held that the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act apply extraterritorially "in order to protect domestic
investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities [and apply to] transactions regarding stocks
traded in the United States which are effected outside the United States, when
extraterritorial application of the [1934] Act is necessary to protect American
investors." See also Des Brisay V. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
(b) As set forth in Section 17 of the Restatement, the subjective principle enables U.S. courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction over conduct within the
U.S. even though such conduct has consequences occurring only outside the U.S.:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within
its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined
by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest
localized, in its territory.
This subjective PrinciDle of jurisdiction would, for example, provide the basis
for a U.S. court to assert jurisdiction under Rule lob-5 against a U.S. issuer or
other U.S. person who participated in an offering of securities abroad to nonU.S. investors based upon the activities of such persons that may have taken
place in the U.S. in connection with the offering. Applying this subjective principle of jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs and non-resident American plaintiffs
in Rule 1Oh-5 cases, the Second Circuit summarized its conclusions as follows:
[Tihe antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
[aipply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to
act) of material importance in the United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
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[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities to
foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable
failures to act) within the United States directly caused

such losses.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). See also, ITT v. Cornfeld, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1197,320 (2d Cir. March 17, 1980).
(2) Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, which exempts from the 1934 Act persons engaged in a "business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States," provides
The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person in so far as he transacts
a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.
The SEC has never adopted regulations under Section 30(b) and courts have not
read the section to limit the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. As interpreted in Schoenbaum, supra, Section 30(b) was
apparently designed to permit brokers, dealers and banks to conduct securities
transactions through foreign securities exchanges without having to comply with
the registration and reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. See 405 F. Supp.
at 207-08. Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), applied Section 30(b)
to hold that Section 7(c) of the 1934 Act and Regulation T of the Board of Covernors of the Federal Reserve System did not apply to transactions in Canadian
securities on a Canadian exchange effected by a Canadian broker-dealer on behalf
of a U.S. citizen, where the credit was extended in Canada, the securities were
held as collateral in Canada, and where the defendant's activities in the United
States, including its registration as a broker-dealer with the SEC, were not substantial. But, cf., United States V. eisscredit Banca Comserciale E. D'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); UFITEC S.A. v. Carter, 135 Cal. Rptr.
607 aff'd 20 Cal. 3d 238, 571 P.2d 990, 142 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1977).
(3) The fact that U.S. persons or corporations with U.S. shareholders ire
defrauded by insider transactions taking place abroad should not be sufficient
in itself to render the transaction subject to the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act. In such circumstances, jurisdiction should have to be based upon the
conduct of the defendant within the U.S. in reliance on the subjective principle
of jurisdiction.

See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v Maxwell, 468 F.2d

1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
b) Specific Applications
(1) With respect to securities traded in both the U.S. market and a foreign market, if a transaction involving inside information took place in the
foreign market, a U.S. court may find subject matter jurisdiction to exist by
applying the objective jurisdictional test provided that the activities abroad
had a damaging effect on U.S. shareholders or had a substantial adverse effect on
the U.S. market. See Schoenbaum, supra. If the transaction involved an ordinary
market transaction on a foreign exchange, however, it is unlikely that the transaction would have a substantial and foreseeable effect within the U.S. unless,
perhaps, the principal trading market for the securities was the foreign market.
(2) If the foreigner holding non-public information has caused a U.S. investor to purchase or sell in a foreign market a security that is not traded in
the U.S., that foreign defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in the U.S.

under Rule lOb-5 only pursuant to the subjective principle of jurisdiction--i.e.,
if essential acts took place in the U.S. that induced the foreign purchases.
See Leasco, supra.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol4/iss1/1

CM Nathan / Trading in mnuliple mnarkets

(3) With respect to securities traded in the U.S. and in foreign markets,
a U.S. court might entertain subject matter jurisdiction in a lob-5 case pursuant
to the subjective principle of jurisdiction based upon conduct of the defendants
within the U.S. who fraudulently induced foreign investors to purchase or sell
the securities in a foreign market. The Second Circuit's decision in Bersch,
supra, however, indicates that mere preparatory actions in the U.S. are not sufficient to justify the application of the 1934 Act with respect to injury to nonU.S. investors. In such cases, the acts in the U.S. must directly cause the loss.
With respect to injury to U.S. investors resident abroad, Bersch indicates that
for subject matter jurisdiction to exist, acts in the U.S. must significantly
contribute to the loss.
c) References: See Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to
International Securities Transactions, in Fordham Institute at 89-172, as well
as the cases and articles cited therein.

2.

Section 16(b)

Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act entitles issuers with securities registered
under §12 of the 1934 Act to recover any profits derived by the issuer's officers
or directors, or any beneficial owmer of more than ten percent of the issuer's
equity securities, from purchases and sales or sales and purchases of the issuer's
equity securities within a six-month period. What are the limits to the application of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act to recovering short-swing profits from insiders who traded securities registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act in multiple markets?
a) If both the purchases and sales are effected in the U.S. market, a
U.S. court would entertain subject matter jurisdiction to recover short-swing
profits even from a non-U.S. investor based upon the subjective principal of jurisdiction because of the activities occurring in the U.S. See Roth v. Fund of Funds,
Ltd., 405 F. 2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
b) Subject matter jurisdiction may not exist, however, for a U.S. court
to recover short-swing profits from a non-U.S. investor under Section 16(b), if
the investor effected the purchases and sales exclusively on foreign exchanges
or in foreign markets. One court has dismissed for lack of in personam jurisdiction a Section 16(b) derivative suit on behalf of a Canadian corporation whose
securities were listed on the AMEX where the transactions were effected in the
Canadian market by Canadian residents. See wgagman v. Astle, 308 F. Supp. 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Stressing that no other country has a rule such as Section 16(b)
that imposes absolute liability for insider trading without any proof of intent
to use inside information, the decision in Wagman offers some support for the
proposition that, as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, it might never be
appropriate for a U.S. court to apply Section 16(b) to purely foreign transactions
effected in foreign markets by foreign nationals. See also Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v.Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (extraterritorial
application of any particular statute is a "question of the interpretation of the
particular statute").
c) It is not clear, however, whether a U.S. court would apply Section
16(b) to transactions effected abroad by U.S. residents or nationals, or match
purchases or sales by a U.S. investor in the U.S. market with his purchases or
sales in foreign markets in order to find liability under Section 16(b). It would
seem less likely that a U.S. court would enforce Section 16(b) against a foreign
national by matching his purchases and sales in the U.S. market with purchases
and sales in foreign markets.
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d) Securities of certain foreign issuers that are registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act are exempt from the provisions of Section 16 of the 1934
Act by virtue of Rule 3a12-3.
3. Proposed Rule 13e-2
a) In Release No. 34-17222 (October 17, 1980), the SEC reproposed Rule
13e-2, which would impose certain purchase limitations, antifraud provisions and
disclosure requirements in connection with issuer repurchases of preferred or
common stock other than those constituting issuer tender offers. The proposed
rule's purchase restrictions, which would not apply to privately negotiated purchases, involve volume, price and timing limitations similar to those contained
in Appendix C under Rule lOb-6, and, in general, prohibit purchases on any single
day through more than one broker or dealer.
b) Issuers with securities registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act
and registered closed-end investment companies [Section 13(e) Issuers] as well as
certain affiliated purchasers would be subject to all provisions of the proposed
rule, while issuers that are reporting companies under Section 15(d) of the 1934
Act would only be subject to the proposed rule's disclosure requirements. Brokerdealers and other persons acting for Section 13(e) Issuers would be subject only
to the proposed rule's antifraud provisions and purchase restrictions.
c) In footnote 53 to the Release, the SEC indicated that the purchase
limitations of the rule 'would not apply to Rule 13e-2 purchases effected in foreign markets." By implication, at least, it would appear that the SEC takes the
position that the other provisions of Rule 13e-2, such as the antifraud and disclosure provisions of the rule, would apply to Rule 13e-2 purchases effected in
foreign markets by or on behalf of U.S. or foreign issuers subject to the rule,
notwithstanding the fact that the SEC or a U.S. court might not have jurisdiction
to enforce Rule 13e-2 in such contexts. Thus, the SEC might take the position
that the antifraud provisions of Rule 13e-2 apply to transactions effected abroad
by foreign broker-dealers on behalf of Section 13(e) Issuers. It would appear,
however, that the antifraud provisions of Rule 13e-2 should apply to foreign
broker-dealers in such circumstances only if such transactions have a substantial
effect on U.S. investors or the U.S. market (i.e., by application of the objective
principle of jurisdiction).
D.

ERISA Restrictions on Ownership by U.S. Plans of Foreign
Securities

1.
The ownership by U.S. persons of foreign securities (and therefore their
participation in both the U.S. and foreign secondary markets for such securities)
is often more effectively deterred by legal restrictions other than those contained in the 1933 Act, such as the imposition of withholding taxes, the applicability
of legal investment statutes and other laws specifically applicable to certain
investors, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
2.
These other legal restrictions are best illustrated by ERISA, which governs pension and profit sharing plans maintained by private employers in the U.S.
Upon the adoption of ERISA in 1974, these plans were prohibited from holding foreign securities outside the U.S. except pursuant to regulations of the Department
of Labor. ERISA Section 404(b). Such regulations were not issued until October
of 1977. See Fed. Reg. 54122 (October 4, 1977) (Rule 404b-l adopted); 46 Fed.
Reg. 1266 (January 6, 1981) (revisions to Rule 404b-1 adopted). Even now, the
regulations are not a wholly satisfactory solution. For example, a plan would
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most likely desire to hold foreign securities through foreign clearing agencies,
such as Euro-clear, to avoid the transaction costs associated with delivery of
physical securities out of Euro-clear. A proposed regulation of the Department
of Labor, however, casts doubt on this procedure, at least to the extent that
such securities are held through a U.S. broker-dealer, since it would prohibit
the holding of securities in the name of a broker-dealer or in a street name,
except under circumstances where the broker-dealer holds the securities as trustee
for the plan pursuant to an executed trust agreement. See 44 Fed. Reg. 50363,
50366 n.14 (August 28, 1979) (proposing Rules 403a-I and 401b-l). Another regulation would permit certain U.S. banks to place the plan's foreign securities
with foreign sub-custodians provided that the U.S. bank remains liable to the
same extent as if it had retained physical possession of the securities in the
U.S. The scope of this commitment, in light of such risks as the imposition of
currency controls, is unclear, and U.S. banks should proceed with caution. In
addition to the legal uncertainties ERISA has created in connection with holding
foreign securities abroad, more mundane considerations deter investment by U.S.
pension and profit sharing plans in foreign securities. For example, plans must
maintain bonds covering foreign custodians holding assets of the plan. Frequently,
bonds maintained by plans do not cover foreign custodians, and appropriate riders
must be obtained.

E.

Insider Trading in Foreign Markets

It is worth noting that several foreign countries have also attempted to
deal with the problem of insider trading. These countries generally regulate
insider trading by means of a criminal statute. See e.g., Tunc, Insider Trading
in France, in L. Gower, L. Loss and A. Sommer, Jr., New Trends in Company Law
Disclosure 5 (1980).. The United Kingdom has recently enacted a comprehensive
statute treating these issues. See Companies Act 1980, Chapter 22, Part V.
See also L. Loss (ed.) Multinational Approaches--Corporate Insiders (1976).
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